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Current U. S. Army doctrine is responding to the realities of shrinking
resource availabilities and rapid evolution of political and social structures in
many parts of the world. The AirLand Operations doctrine envisions a
nonlinear battlefield encompassing large areas, with widely dispersed fighting
units. This type of conflict places great demands on many of the classically
recognized attributes of fighting forces, including Command and Control,
Communications, Intelligence gathering, Mobility, Synchronization, Agility
of forces, Initiative and Depth.
The Army has for many years employed Combat Training Centers to
provide tactical forces with realistic exercises, enhancing their abilities for
engagement in real combat. Such exercises typically result in subjective After
Action Reports (AARs) which can be used to critique unit performance and
suggest additional training guidelines. The National Training Center (NTC)
at Fort Irwin, California, is highly instrumented to gather many types of data
for simulated combat, including time-position data from many different units
during an exercise, as well as weapon firings and target kills for both forces. A
General Accounting Office report [1] has mentioned that the National
Training Center achieves the objective of providing training under realistic
conditions. This report also mentions that the Army has not realized the full
potential it had envisioned for the National Training Center, falling short of
the goal of objectively assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of its
organizations and weapon systems. Two major causes are cited for this
perceived shortfall:
• The Army has not identified the types of data needed to assess
unit performance over the long term.
• Objective data collected through the Center's instrumentation
system is too unreliable and incomplete for overall analysis.
Army doctrine stresses four basic battlefield tenets: Initiative, Agility,
Depth and Synchronization, all of which contribute heavily to success on the
modern battlefield. Objective indications of how well a particular brigade/
battalion force performed according to these tenets, for a given battle, would
form a useful training tool. Such indications would also help answer the
shortfalls addressed by the General Accounting Office report.
TRAC Monterey has contracted with the Naval Postgraduate School to
investigate useful, graphic presentations of the synchronization and agility of
battalion/brigade size forces at the National Training Center. This report
discusses the current state of this research and illustrates a number of graphic
presentations of synchronization which should prove useful in After Action
Reviews of performance at the National Training Center. These displays may
also prove appropriate for the unit take-home packages for review, as well as
reference for future training.
Project description
A major goal of the Battle Enhanced Analysis Methodology (BEAM)
project is the development of computer displays which meaningfully picture
synchronization and agility in a tactical level battle. This in turn requires the
identification of measurable quantities which portray these two attributes.
Both of these terms are rather broad and general, subject to a number of
interpretations, possibly dependent on the context in which they are used. To
gain insight into the way in which the Army employs these words in the
defining tenets, many field manuals and other documents have been
reviewed; several of these are discussed briefly below and are listed in the
references. This review of written material has been supplemented with
expert Army (and other service) opinion, also discussed in the following
section.
As a result of the documentation review and assessment of expert
opinion, it was decided to concentrate initial efforts on picturing aspects of
synchronization. This remains a broad term which can be applied in several
ways, one of the most basic of which is the synchronization of weapon firing.
Displays of direct fire synchronization have been developed and are
illustrated. These displays may also prove easily adaptable to displays of
indirect fire, which will be addressed in the latter part of this project.
Another aspect of synchronization refers to movement of forces; displays
for this type of synchronization have also been developed and will be
discussed. These displays of synchronization (of both direct fire and
movement) can be animated over time, during the course of the battle. Such
animation is expected to prove useful as measures or indicators of agility,
another one of the battle tenets.
Doctrine review, expert opinions
A survey of current U. S. Army doctrine was undertaken, to find the latest
interpretations of the four battlefield tenets: Initiative, Agility, Depth and
Synchronization. The main focus of the initial effort is synchronization,
which has many facets, some of which are more easily quantified and
portrayed than others. Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5 [2]) defines synchroni-
zation as follows:
Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in
time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat
power at the decisive point. Synchronization is both a process
and a result. (May 5, 1986, page 17)
This manual stresses the importance of synchronization in both offensive
and defensive operations. Indeed, it points out that a good defensive
procedure is to interrupt the synchronization of the attacker.
Field Manual 71-3 ([3D refers to synchronization fairly extensively; it states
that synchronization of operations is required to obtain maximum combat
power from the combined arms team, but does not give a definition of the
word, per se. Brigades synchronize their operations (page 1-3) by
• Completing an extensive Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB) to include the Decision Support Template (DST).
• Designating and resourcing the brigade main effort.
• Coordinating and integrating Combat Service (CS) and Combat
Service Support (CSS) efforts.
• Using the logistics estimate to ensure adequate resources are
available and allocated.
• Rapidly massing combat power to achieve local surprise and
shock effect without lengthy explanations or orders.
• Planning in advance to exploit the opportunities created by
tactical success.
• Allowing decentralized operations.
• Using smoke to conceal maneuver and allow massing of combat
power.
This manual includes two 4-page foldouts, one for offense and one for
defense, to portray "what synchronization looks like" (pages 3-8,9 and pages 4-
15,16). These figures give a generalized battlefield template, and a discussion
of a number of operations at various depths of the battlefield. No indication
of a time parameter is employed in either of these figures.
In Field Manual 71-2 (FM 71-2 [4]), synchronization is called one of the
four characteristics of successful operations (the other three are the remaining
tenets listed in FM 100-5). On page 1-6 it is stated that "Synchronization is the
process of integrating the activities on the battlefield to produce the desired
result. Synchronization of operations is required in order to maximize the
combat power of the combined arms team. It requires a command, control,
and communications system that can mass and focus the combat power of the
task force at the decisive time and place." In discussing synchronization of
offensive operations (page 3-28), it is stated that the commander and his staff
synchronize and integrate all combat, combat support and combat service
support assets organic and available to the battalion task force. No indication
is given of how this is to be achieved. In discussing synchronization of
defensive operations, (page 4-24) it states that "The success of the defense is
determined by how effectively all supporting organizations are integrated
into the maneuver plan." A discussion of the sequence of the defense is
given, but no reference is made to synchronization. Synchronization of attack
helicopters (page 6-22) refers to coordination of activities of ground and
aviation commanders.
Mission Training Plan 71-2-MTP [5] describes training plans for a battalion,
at several different levels, the highest of which is the Field Training Exercise
(FTX); it includes suggested ways of carrying out such training and gives
examples of After Action Reviews for evaluation of the training. The
battalion tasks are supported by tables which list varying numbers of subtasks,
with GO - NO/GO options to be checked. A few of these subtasks refer to
synchronization, but no guidance is given about standards the reviewer
should employ in choosing the GO versus NO/GO choice.
On page 1-2, Field Manual 71-1 (FM 71-1 [6]) gives essentially the same
definition of synchronization as [2]. It points out that this requires careful
timing and teamwork, especially at the company level. This document
appears to use co-ordination as a synonym for synchronization, although that
is not explicitly stated. The thesis by C. L. Long ([7]) provides a review of many
Army manuals and points out the lack of consistency in definition of
synchronization (and the frequent lack of any definition at all). He suggests
and illustrates the use of a synchronization matrix and gives a detailed
discussion of such a construct for a battle defending southern California from
a Soviet-style Arizona attack. His discussion and synchronization matrix
explicitly recognize and employ a time parameter. Student text 100-9 ([8])
stresses synchronization, and includes discussion of (essentially) Long's
synchronization matrix as a useful tool. It points out the fact that time is a
critical aspect of synchronization and states that synchronization is essential
to retain the initiative in a battle. It discusses the importance of
synchronization of combat power and recognizes the fact that Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a continuous process. This text states
that war gaming is a key step in the synchronization of the efforts of the G2
and G3 functions and that synchronization is maintained as the battle
progresses by continuing intelligence updates of the IPB.
In addition to a review of the above documents (and several others), a
group discussion was held with Naval Postgraduate School Army and Marine
Corps officer students. This centered on the various aspects of synchro-
nization and meaningful ways of objectively assessing synchronization,
especially in a defensive posture. Ideas were generated on observable
variables which capture at least parts of synchronization and possible further
sources to explore objective assessment of synchronization.
To observe the current instruction given at the tactical level, and to gather
opinions of the instructors there for measuring synchronization, one week
was spent at the Tactical Commanders Development Course (TCDC) at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. This involved attending the class being held at the
time and discussing possible computer displays of synchronization with the
course instructors and TITAN contractor personnel. One possibility
considered for an objective measure of synchronization was the development
of a scoring system of the synchronization of the Battlefield Operating
Systems (BOSs) individually and in pairs; the seven BOSs considered were
Command & Control, Maneuver, Fire Support, Intelligence, Air Defense,
Mobility, Countermobility & Survivability, and Combat Service Support. This
approach was discussed with several TCDC instructors and TITAN contractor
personnel; cards for suggested input had been previously prepared, to be
returned for possible inclusion in development of displays. This effort did not
prove successful in generating suggestions. The TCDC course quite explicitly
addresses synchronization, and refers to it as both a process and a result, in
accord with FM 100-5 [2]. The course stresses that effective synchronization
requires many things, including
• Anticipation of enemy actions
• Mastery of time-space relationships on the battlefield.
• Unity of purpose
• Understanding of weapons capabilities
• Knowledge of battlefield decision points.
This exposure proved very useful in illustrating the complexities involved in
tactical level planning and execution, and in highlighting the many facets of
synchronization.
Three days were spent at the National Training Center , Fort Irwin,
California, which allowed observation of a battle in progress, and several
After Action Reviews, to see how synchronization issues are currently
portrayed. Discussions of synchronization were held with members of the
operations group; examples of current JANUS displays for AARs were
available for viewing. A version of the currently developed Line of Sight
(LOS) display was installed on a Macintosh, to gather comments from
operations group personnel, and for possible future use in AARs. A tour of
several areas of Fort Irwin was useful in observing the actual terrain over
which many of the battles at NTC are run.
Implications of review and opinions
Computer displays which meaningfully picture synchronization to combat
personnel should be easy to understand and be obviously linked to one or
more of the common ways in which the term is used. Synchronization is a
broad term; it clearly encompasses coordination and integration of separate
parts, both before and during the battle. Indeed it is also meant to be a result,
as stated in FM 100-5, with the goal of maximizing relative combat power at
the decisive point. In FM 100-5, "combat power" is defined to have four
components: Maneuver, Firepower, Protection and Leadership. Of these,
FM 100-5 identifies Leadership as being the most essential. Unfortunately, as
also pointed out in this manual, there are no ready formulas for measuring
this essential element, so it has not been considered as a possible candidate for
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displays. The two components of Protection (making soldiers, systems, units
difficult to locate and destroy, in addition to health and morale issues) are
also not easy to quantify for display and have not been actively considered for
visual portrayal.
The remaining two components of combat power, Maneuver and
Firepower, can be quantified in a number of ways and have been studied as
candidates for useful computer displays of synchronization of a tactical force.
The following sections provide discussions of possible ways to display these
two components of combat power.
Displays of Synchronization
As indicated in the above discussion, synchronization of battle forces is
evidenced in many ways; the most obvious candidates for display are
firepower and maneuver. Firepower may be provided in two essentially
different manners: from direct fire weapons or from indirect fire weapons
(including both artillery and air support). The initial effort of this study has
concentrated on displaying the firepower of direct fire weapons. Displays of
firepower for indirect fire weapons will be addressed in a subsequent report.
Our initial displays of direct fire weapon firepower were developed by
Major D. A. Dryer, giving a visual indication of the lines of sight afforded
weapons placed in selected defensive positions. These are discussed further
below. The existence of line of sight is necessary for the employment of a
direct fire weapon, but does not give any indication of the actual destructive
power of these defensive weapons. Thus a further type of display (Destructive
Potential) has been developed by Major R. M. Lamont ([10]); this display is
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also discussed below. Captain M. S. Nelson ([11]) has studied displays of
maneuver, which are also discussed.
Line of Sight (LOS) display.
As discussed previously, a result of synchronization is the production of
maximum relative combat power at the decisive point; one component of
combat power is Firepower, the provision of destructive force essential to
defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. Direct fire weapons are a major
component of this destructive force; the effectiveness of these weapons, in
turn, depends on their lines of sight, the (possible) target areas they are able to
see. If a force has placed its direct fire weapons in locations where they cannot
see the main battle area, they will not be effective in contributing to the
combat power in that area. Thus, the lines of sight for any particular
placement of direct fire weapons control their effectiveness in any battle. If
the lines of sight are massed at the decisive area of the battle (at the correct
point in time) these weapons will be able to contribute to the combat power of
the force; if lines of sight do not exist (at this time) they do not contribute to
the combat power.
This line of reasoning leads to consideration of a graphical display of the
lines of sight available to direct fire weapons, given their deployment
positions (and their orientation at these positions). Digital terrain
representations, as used in the JANUS combat model (and others), allow the
determination of lines of sight between points within the area being depicted.
If one has placed individual direct fire weapons at given locations, it is
straightforward to determine the points on the battlefield which can be seen
by each of them. Indeed, one can go further and build an LOS surface whose
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height at any point on the ground is given by the number of direct fire
weapons which are able to see that point; the higher the surface at a given
point, the greater is the massing of lines of sight at that point. This surface can
then be colored according to its height and displayed in two dimensions over
the contour map of the area. The changes in color over a given region reflect
the changes in the massing of the lines of sight, for the given locations of the
weapons used.
This type of display (in grey scale) is given in Figure 1; having actual colors
for differentiation, as is easily done with modern computer displays, gives
more information than just the grey scale shading of this figure. This figure
portrays a portion of the NTC with 10 friendly tanks located in the top center
of the screen, in an area bounded by y-coordinates 105 and 107 and x-
coordinates 51 and 53. The number of tanks that can see any given point, and
which are within effective firing range, then varies from to 10. These
numbers in turn were color coded with dark blue representing 1 tank having
LOS; the colors used ranged through lighter blue to green to yellow to red to
signify 10 tanks with lines of sight to the given point. Absence of a color
overlay means no tanks have LOS to that point. In the grey-scale image dark
blue (one tank) and red (10 tanks) are both quite black and not distinguishable.
The dark area in the center of the lines of sight is red, while the border dark
area is in fact blue. The massing of the lines of sight (red), for the chosen
defensive positions, lies between engagement areas Shark and Cuda, which
were named in the commander's IPB. With this choice of defensive positions
for the tanks, the lines of sight are not perfectly massed in either engagement
area.
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Figure 1. Line of sight display
Displays like Figure 1 give snapshot pictures which are useful in
portraying the massing (or lack of massing) of one aspect of the combat power
of the force at a given point in time. Constructing such snapshots at various
points in time, and running them sequentially, can give a valuable indication
of how the massing of the lines of sight changed during the battle, due to
either movement or attrition of the weapons portrayed. The opposing force
locations can also be overlaid on the same picture, giving a more complete
description of the dynamics of the battle. Indeed, animation of LOS displays
over time can be the basis of a measure of agility, showing how well the
massing of lines of sight tracked a moving enemy force.
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Destruction Potential (DP) displays
The LOS display simply describes the absence or presence of line of sight
between points, giving no indication of how much damage a weapon, or the
full force, might inflict on the corresponding point. There are a number of
ways that a display can indicate the amount of destruction which could be
inflicted at each point in a given area; this type of display will be called a
Destruction Potential display.
One procedure which could be used to quantify destruction potential is
similar in spirit to that used by T. N. Dupuy ([9]) in his Quantified Judgment
Model (QJM) of the theory of combat. The procedure to be described was
suggested and investigated by Major R. W. Lamont ([10]). Suppose a weapon
(for example a tank) is located at point x; the LOS display just discussed then
can determine those points a in any given area A for which line of sight exists
between x and a. These points a. within the range of the weapon then would
be potential targets for the weapon located at x. Suppose the weapon (at x) has
probability pr,w,t of hitting and killing a target of type t located at point a., and
that the weapon is capable of firing Rw rounds per minute; the subscript r is
meant to indicate the range between x and a., recognizing the dependence of
the probability on this factor, while w is used to indicate the type of weapon at
point x and t indicates the type of target at point a.. Clearly, if a target were
positioned at point a., the weapon either would or would not kill this target.
To develop a comparative measure it is useful to pretend that an endless
series of targets is available at point a.; when (and if) a given target is
destroyed at this point it is instantly replaced by another. If there were such an
endless series of targets of the given type located at a, and the weapon were to
commence firing at its maximum rate, the expected number of kills this
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weapon would make at this point, in a one minute period, is the product
RivPr,w,t-
Now suppose the Blue force has some number n of direct fire weapons,
each of which has line of sight to the same point a. The accumulated expected
number of kills that Blue could make in a one minute period against targets
of type t, at this point, then is the sum D\
t i
= X^ RwPr,w,t; this is essentially
the kernel of Dupuy's QJM measure of combat power. This sum can be
evaluated for each point a in an area A (for given firing weapon types zv and
targets t), defining a surface over area A, which could be plotted in place of the
LOS. It gives a measure of the destructive potential of the Blue force, for this
type of weapon versus this type of target, over area A. This procedure then
gives a surface for all points a in a given area A, describing the destructive
potential of a given type of weapon w versus a given type of target t. Such a
surface could be plotted individually for each combination of target type and
weapon used, or these could be combined in various ways.
For example, if a company of Bradley fighting vehicles were in given
defensive positions, defending an area of interest, a surface for each of their
two weapons could be constructed, against any given type target t. These two
surfaces then could be combined (say a weighted average, as suggested in [10])
to give a single surface representing the Bradley's total expected kills of targets
of the given type in the given area. In similar manner the expected numbers
of kills could be aggregated over several different possible target types in area
A. See [10] for more discussion of this type of combination of firepower over
weapon types, and to see examples of resulting color-coded two-dimensional
displays of this type of DP. Figure 2 presents a grey-scale picture of the DP
surface for two defending tank companies, in the same area of the NTC that
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Figure 2. Destruction potential display, beginning of battle.
was pictured in Figure 1, using the defending positions chosen by a group
undergoing training. The colors used in this display are different, with those
showing up darker uniquely indicating higher DP values; lighter shading
indicates lower DP scores. Figure 3 shows the ultimate result of the DP surface
for the historical battle (the defense did not succeed).
Lamont replayed this battle in Janus(A), using initial defensive positions
which followed published doctrine more closely than did those used by the
unit undergoing training. His initial DP surface (at the start of the battle) is
visually indistinguishable from Figure 2, the historical placement. The
resulting DP surface 120 minutes into the battle is given in Figure 4; note that
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BATTLE TIME: 120 MINS
Figure 3. Destruction potential display, 120 minutes into historical battle.
his placement at the conclusion of the battle, which agreed well with other
attrition based measures of the battle outcomes. See [10] for more details.
This expected value measure of destructive potential takes into account
line of sight, firing weapon type and rate of fire, and the type of target. Other
definitions of destructive potential could be used, two of which will now be
described; these alternatives have not currently been implemented for
comparison with Djj.
At any point in time there could be at most one target of a given type at a
given point. A different measure of DP is given by simply evaluating the





(COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE)
BATTLE TIME: 120 MINS
MPS
Figure 4. Destruction potential display, 120 minutes into battle, revised
locations.
defending force, rather than evaluating the expected number of kills. Again,
letting pr,w,t represent the probability of hitting and killing a target of the
given type, at range r from weapon w, if all defending weapons were to
independently fire one round at the (same) target at point a, the probability
the target survives (is not killed) then is nw (l-pr,w,0> the product of the
probabilities of each weapon not killing the target. The probability the target is
killed then is 1 minus this quantity D2,t = 1- Tlw (l-prtWi t), which is an
alternative measure of the destructive potential of an array of Blue forces
against this type of target at this point. This function Di,t could also be used to
define a surface over all the points a in a region A. While the expected value
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DP surface suggested by Lamont is linear in the p r ,w,t values, this second
suggested surface is multiplicative in these values.
This second measure of destructive potential (D2,t) combines the kill
probabilities of the various Blue forces in a different way than Dij. It does not
account for the rates of fire of the weapons, although it is easily modified to
accomplish this, if desired. Suppose, as above, that weapon w has rate of fire
Rw (again in rounds per minute). Then the probability that this weapon will
miss the target at a with Rw independently aimed rounds is (l-pr,w,t)Rw; if
each of the weapons with line of sight to point a were to fire at maximum rate
at a target at this point, the probability the target survives is then
D3
t
t=l-nw(l--prtWi t)Rw, which gives a third candidate measure of destructive
potential. Which of these destructive potential displays might be most
meaningful in any given case is a matter of military judgment. Any of them,
animated through time, provides a useful indication of the combat power of
the defending force through the course of the battle.
Any of these three suggested measures of DP could be used to display part
of the objectively observable component of the Blue force's combat power
over the region A. The same indicator of Red's combat power over the same
region A, at the same time, could also be evaluated; then the ratio of these
two surfaces provides a measure of the relative combat power of the two
forces over area A. Granted the ratio is determined by Blue value divided by
Red value, then Blue force's combat power exceeds that of the Red force for
all points a where this ratio exceeds 1. This ratio could then also be plotted
and color coded to indicate relative combat power of the two forces. One could
use blue for those points a at which this ratio exceeds 1 and red for those
points where it is less than 1 to simply indicate this relative combat power.
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Rather than contrasting the combat powers of the two forces over the
same region A, it may be more meaningful to examine Blue's combat power
surface over the area ^4^ occupied by Red's combat systems, and to examine
Red's combat power surface over the area Ab occupied by Blue's combat
systems. This enables evaluation of the threat posed by each side against its
opposition.
Maneuver displays
Both the LOS and DP displays discussed above and currently available
computer generated tactical displays can be enhanced by the optional
superposition of one or more displays illustrating maneuver of the friendly
or enemy forces. Several maneuver displays are currently under
development. Key features of the forces that should be shown include the
type and size of the unit, the centroid, the spatial arrangement, and the rate
and direction of movement (the track). Warfighters currently use standard
military unit symbols and hand-drawn circles, ellipses, and arrows to add
these to the computer generated displays at the NTC. Many of the computer-
generated displays at the NTC include a symbol for every weapon system,
leading to a rather cluttered display for battalion sized groups.
Nelson ([11]) considers meaningful ways of using graphic symbols to
represent company, or larger, groups as a whole, requiring considerably fewer
symbols on a computer display. He specifically addresses the above features
(type and size, centroid, spatial arrangement, direction and rate of travel) in
replacing individual symbols by unit symbols. He suggests using standard
military symbols for identifying units, with the center of the symbol at the
unit's centroid position (at a given time point). The location of the centroid
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can be defined in several different ways; Nelson discusses the merits of the (x-
mean, y-mean) pair, trimmed mean pairs, and the (x-median, y-median) pair
for this purpose.
Similarly, the dispersion of a unit at a given time can be pictured in many
different ways. To give the most realistic representation of unit dispersion at a
given time, he considers a number of different convex shapes, centered at the
centroid, which contain a given fraction of the members of the unit. The
ellipse is considered a useful shape to employ, as is the "convex hull". This
latter shape has the advantage of giving more detailed information than does
the smoother looking ellipse.
Figure 5 shows a prototype display of these features for two company sized
armor units over 25 minutes of a battle, representing actual company
movements from a battle fought at the NTC. The small rectangles are
standard military symbols representing the type and size of the units. They
are centered on the unit centroids, which are the (x-median, y-median) pairs
of the two companies. The small circles in Figure 5 denote the centroids at 5-
minute increments; the track covered is evident, with the rate of advance
being given by the distance between successive centroid locations. The
relative movement of the two companies is easily comprehended. The final
arrowheads indicate the line of future movement and actually locate the
centroid positions at the next time point. This figure uses the convex hull
representation of the unit dispersions. These polygonal figures contain the
75% of the unit members which are closest to the centroid. The sharp corners
thus indicate individual unit locations, a feature not present with smoother













UTM MAP GRID IN KILOMETERS
37 38
Figure 5. Maneuver of two tank companies over 25 minutes of battle.
Overlaying a terrain map with Nelson's unit symbology (for both sides)
gives an uncluttered view of the dynamics of a battle. Animation (at some
time increment) with the ability to pause at selected times will provide a
powerful tool for critiquing performances encountered in unit training.
Figure 5 was developed by Major Nelson using the programming
language APL2 and the interactive software system A Graphical Statistical
System (AGSS) at the Naval Postgraduate School under a test site agreement




The current candidate BEAM User Interface is pictured in Figure 6. This
has been discussed with personnel at both the TCDC and the NTC for possible
modification (as well as others). As pictured here, the user would select one of
the current tenets, the scenario type, the Battlefield Operating System (BOS) of
interest, as well as which aspect of the tenet-BOS combination is of interest.
This would then bring to the screen an appropriate display for the
combination selected. For many of the planned displays, animation would
seem useful and appropriate, as would the possibility of choosing additional
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Figure 6. Suggested user interface for displays.
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additional options describing the time increments available for the
animation, and the additional overlays which might be of interest.
Conclusions
The BEAM project has produced a number of displays that are useful in
portraying synchronization of forces, especially for defensive scenarios. It is
expected that slight modifications of the LOS and DP displays will also
provide good descriptors for attack scenarios. A time trace of the maximum
value of a DP display, together with the enemy's maneuver display (small
multiples), will give one way of portraying the agility of a tactical force. This
symbology developed to describe the movement and maneuver of an
armored company over time is equally applicable in displaying the maneuver
of larger sized groups as well.
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